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Abstract
This thesis presents the results of research in two different areas of applied mathematics. Firstly,
mathematical biology and secondly in mathematical economics.
Mathematical biology: We study an ODE system that models immune responses by CD4+ T cells,
with the presence of Regulatory T cells (Tregs). We assume that the secreting T cells have a lower
death rate than the non secreting T cells and that the active Tregs also have a lower death rate than
the inactive Tregs. We present explicit formulas that give the relation at equilibria between the
concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs and the antigenic stimulation of T cells. For some
parameter values, we found a hysteresis, characterized by a region of bistability, with two stable
equilibria and one unstable equilibrium, bounded by two thresholds of antigenic stimulation of T
cells. At some parameter values, we observe an unfold of the hysteresis. Moreover, we consider a
model with a linear tuning between the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the antigenic stimulation
of Tregs. For this model, we also present explicit formulas for the relation at equilibria between
the concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs and the antigenic stimulation of T cells. In
this model, the hysteresis is also present. Furthermore, for some parameter values, we observe the
appearance of an isolated region with equilibria, an isola, and for other values of the parameters, we
observe a transcritic bifurcation.
Mathematical economics: We study a model of Edgeworthian economies where, at each time pe-
riod, the participants are randomly matched in pairs to exchange two goods. The participants trade
with the aim of increasing their utility, given by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and are allowed
to deviate from their bilateral equilibrium. Provided the market and the trade follow appropriate
symmetry conditions, we show that, at each time period, the expectation of the logarithm of the trading
price is equal to the expectation of the logarithm of the Walrasian price, being both fixed along the time.
Keywords: Dynamical Systems, Game Theory, Immunity, T cells, Tregs, General Equilibrium,
Walrasian price, random matching market.
Resumo
Esta tese apresenta os resultados da investigação em duas áreas diferentes de matemática aplicada.
Em primeiro lugar, em biologia matemática e em segundo lugar em economia matemática.
Biologia matemática: Estudamos um sistema de EDO que modela respostas imunitárias por células
T CD4+, na presença de células T Reguladoras (Tregs). Assumimos que as células T secretoras têm
uma taxa de mortalidade menor do que as células T não secretoras e que as Tregs ativas também
têm uma taxa de mortalidade menor do que as Tregs inativas. Apresentamos fórmulas explícitas que
dão a relação em equilíbrio entre a concentração de células T, a concentração das Tregs e o estímulo
antigénico das células T. Para alguns valores dos parâmetros, encontramos uma histerese, caracterizada
por uma região de biestabilidade, com dois equilíbrios estáveis e um equilíbrio instável, limitada por
dois limiares de estímulo antigénico das células T. Ademais, consideramos um modelo com um ajuste
linear entre o estímulo antigénico das células T e o estímulo antigénico das Tregs. Para este modelo
também apresentamos fórmulas explícitas que dão a relação em equilíbrio entre a concentração de
células T, a concentração das Tregs e o estímulo antigénico das células T. Neste modelo, a histerese
também está presente. Além disso, para alguns valores dos parâmetros, observamos o aparecimento
de uma região isolada com equilíbrios, uma isola, e para outros valores dos parâmetros, observamos
uma bifurcação transcrítica.
Economia matemática: Estudamos um modelo de economias Edgeworthianas onde, em cada período
de tempo, os participantes são selecionados aleatoriamente em pares para trocar dois bens. Os par-
ticipantes trocam com o objectivo de aumentar a sua utilidade, dada por funções de utilidade de
Cobb-Douglas, e podem desviar-se do seu equilíbrio bilateral. Desde que o mercado e as trocas
obedeçam às condições de simetria apropriadas, mostramos que, em cada período de tempo, o valor
esperado do logaritmo do preço de troca é igual ao valor esperado do logaritmo do preço Walrasiano,
sendo ambos fixos ao longo do tempo.
Palavras-chave: Sistemas Dinâmicos, Teoria de Jogos, Imunidade, células T, Tregs, Equilíbrio
Geral, preço Walrasiano, mercado de emparelhamento aleatório
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis is a result of scientific research work in two areas of applied mathematics: mathematical
biology and mathematical economics.
In the first part we study immune responses by CD4+T cells, within the presence of regulatory T
cells. The model we use is based on the model initially proposed by Burroughs et al. [21] with
the modifications proposed by Pinto et al. [57]. In Pinto et al. [57], asymmetric death rates were
considered - the active cells have lower death rates than the inactive ones - emulating the presence
of memory T cells. Here, we extend the work of Oliveira et al. [54], by showing exact formulas for
the equilibria. We observe that the relation between the concentration of T cells, the concentration
of Tregs and the antigenic stimulation of T cells is a hysteresis. Inside the region bounded by two
antigenic thresholds we found two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibria. We observe that the
hysteresis can be unfolded for some values of the parameters. Furthermore, we compute numerically
the eigenvalues that allow us to classify the obtained equilibria as stable or unstable. Following the
model by Pinto et al. [57], we also model a positive correlation between the antigenic stimulation of
T cells, and the antigenic stimulation of Tregs using a linear tuning. We were able to obtain explicit
formulas for the relation between the concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs and the
antigenic stimulation of T cells, thereby expanding the results in Burroughs et al. [23] and Oliveira
et al. [54]. Depending on the parameter values, we observed an hysteresis and the appearance of an
isolated region of equilibria, an isola, that may merge with the hysteresis. At the point of contact, we
have a transcritical bifurcation. This area is a joint work with B.M.P.M. Oliveira, Alberto A. Pinto,
Isabel P. Figueiredo, and N. J. Burroughs. This work resulted in a submitted paper [55], and two
communications in conferences.
In the second part we study a model of Edgeworthian economies where participants meet in random
pairs to exchange two goods. Each participant’s endowment and preferences follow a probability
distribution that satisfies the p-statistical duality condition. The p-statistical duality condition imposes
on each participant a dual (mirrow) participant with opposite preference and symmetric endowments,
hence guaranteeing the occurrence of trade with probability greater than zero. Each participant seeks
to maximize his utility according to the Cobb-Douglas function. We allow trade to deviate from the
bilateral equilibrium to a point outside the core, expanding the model in Ferreira et al. [32]. Our
model has similar bases to the model with "zero intelligent" traders by Gode and Sunder [37]. Our
objective is to study the convergence of transaction prices to equilibrium levels when trade is allowed
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2to occur to a point that does not belong in the core. This part is a joint work with B.M.P.M. Oliveira,
Alberto A. Pinto, Athanassios N. Yannacopoulos, and Bärbel F. Finkenstädt. The work resulted in a
paper in preparation [56] and seven communications in conferences.
The work is divided into four chapters, followed by bibliography. In Chapter 2 we present exact
equilibria for a model of T cells and Tregs. In Chapter 3 we present a model of Edgeworthian
economies. In Chapter 4 we present a general conclusion of the research work.
Chapter 2
Exact equilibria for a model of T cells
and Tregs
2.1 Introduction
Human immune system can be triggered by pathogen infections - its primary function is the protection
of the host from invasion by virus, bacteria or parasites. Lympocytes are a part of immune system that
recognizes and responds to specific antigens, they are a subset of the Leukocytes, also known as white
blood cells. T cells are a group of Lymphocytes that mature in the thymus, activated under exposure
to their specific antigens, and leading to secretion of growth cytokines, predominantly Interleukin
2 (IL-2). The population of T cells consists of different types, each with different immunological
functions and phenotypes. However, the immune response of T cells is specific: it opposes the pro-
gression of an infection characterized by activating a unique set of antigen receptors (T cell receptors,
TCR) on the cell surface. Usually, T cells proliferate rapidly at the maximum expansion rate following
the activation of a small number of them by a pathogen. The infection may be removed during this
expansion phase, the expansion stops after some time and the number of activated T cells is reduced
drastically, while some of them may become memory T cells during this process.
A healthy individual should have his immune system capable of differentiating between cells infected
with a pathogen and uninfected cells in order to properly protect the human system. However, this is
not always the case: the immune system may fail to differentiate the uninfected cells from infected
ones, targeting self-antigens and triggering an autoimmune response, that may cause tissue damage
and even death [65]. The onset and development of autoimmunity have been attributed to factors such
as environment, age, and genetic predisposition [13, 20]. There are several possible mechanisms of
interaction between a pathogen and the immune system, with a popular opinion that autoimmunity
can, in many cases, be attributed to "molecular mimicry" where linear peptide epitopes, processed
from viral proteins, mimic normal host self-proteins, leading to a cross-reaction of immune response
against virus with host cells [30, 40].
Regulatory T cells (Tregs) play a role in limiting these mistakes due to their immune-suppressive
ability. They are generated in the thymus under positive selection by self peptides [41]. At a genetic
level, the Tregs express Foxp3, a master regulator of the Treg phenotype inducing CD25, CTLA-4 and
GITR expression, all correlating with a suppressive phenotype [64]. In the presence of active Tregs
3
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the growth of conventional T cells is inhibited. Part of this growth inhibition is the inhibition of IL-2
secretion by T cells [67, 70]. A delicate fit is needed to have immune responses whenever necessary,
whilst keeping autoimmunity controlled. In order to develop immune responses in the presence of
Tregs, a higher number of T cells need to be activated. Hence, secretion inhibition manipulates the
growth dynamics and effectively increases the quorum threshold - shown to act as a growth modulator
through adjustment of a quorum threshold associated with cytokine growth dynamics. Burroughs et
al. [21, 22] showed that cytokine dependent growth exhibits a quorum T cell population threshold
that determines if immune responses develop on activation. Thus Treg induced secretion inhibition
can provide a mechanism for tissue specific regulation of the balance between suppression (control)
and immune responses, a balance that can be varied at the local tissue level through the regulation of
the local active Treg population size.
Some researches examined the consequences of regulatory T cell (Treg) inhibition of interleukine
2 secretion by the use of mathematical modeling. They studied how a balance is established and
controlled between appropriate immune activation and immune response suppression. Segal et al. [65]
studied the interactions between effector and regulator cells, using it to provide an insight into T cells
vaccination. Borghans and de Boer [17] and Borghans et al. [18] demonstrated how the interactions
of auto-reactive and regulatory T cells can lead to the onset of autoimmunity or stable oscillations
around a vaccinated state. León et al. [42–44] studied the dynamics of interactions between T cells
for the purpose of immune response regulation and control of autoimmune reaction. Blyuss and
Nicholson [14, 15] presented a mathematical model for the dynamics of an immune response to a
viral infection and autoimmunity, which takes into account T cells with different activation thresholds.
They showed how the infection can be cleared by the immune system, as well as showed it could lead
to chronic infection or recurrent infection with relapses and remissions, analyzing the potential impact
of treatment of autoimmune disease in the chronic and recurrent states.
Burroughs et al. [21, 22] examined a mechanism of Treg control of immune responses through
regulation of cytokine dependent T cell proliferation, where Tregs affect the level of cytokine through
both adsorption and secretion inhibition. They propose that Tregs locally adjust the immune response
threshold by inhibiting IL-2 secretion, while assuming that Treg density is controlled through some
type of nonlinear competition. Depending on the strength of activation and initial conditions, below a
certain threshold of autoimmune antigenic stimulation the autoimmune population may be controlled
at low concentrations while Treg population reverts to a homeostatic state. Beyond that threshold the
autoimmune population expands and escapes control. At low antigen stimulation levels autoimmune
T cells are always controlled for all initial loads. For antigenic stimulation levels between the two
thresholds, escape requires the initial load to be sufficiently high. At high antigenic stimulation levels,
control is lost and autoimmunity arises. Moreover, even if the antigen stimulation level falls to the
original value, at which control was originally achieved, control may not be reacquired, and is only
attained if stimulation falls below a second lower threshold. This is a common phenomenon that is
termed as hysteresis.
Burroughts et al. [23–25] further studied the T cell proliferation thresholds. Burroughs et al. [23]
determined the analytic formula that describes the fine balance between T cells and Tregs at controlled
and immune response equilibrium states. They observed the points where a cusp bifurcation occur
and the hysteresis is unfold, showing a drastic change in the dynamical behavior. Burroughs et al.
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[24] studied how autoimmunity may arise from bystander proliferation of T cells. They observed
that if the population of the bystander T cells becomes large enough due to an exposure to pathogen,
autoimmunity can arise after a long transient period. In a different article Burroughs et al. [25]
compared the dynamics of the bystander proliferation between the model with symmetric death rates
by Burroughs et al. [21] and the model with asymmetric death rates by Pinto et al. [57], and observed
that the asymmetry allows a slightly faster growth rate of the T cells, in particular for high antigenic
stimulations of T cells. Burroughs et al. also considered a model with positive correlation between
the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of Tregs [23]. They observed the
presence of a hysteresis and an isolated region of equilibria, an isola. By increasing the slope parame-
ter, the isola would merge with the hysteresis and at the point of contact we observe a transcritical
bifurcation. Oliveira et al. [54] further analyzed the model of immune response by CD4+ T cells with
the asymmetry presented by Pinto et al. [57]. They presented approximate formulas that describe the
balance between the concentration of T cells and Tregs for the case not considering a tuning and for
the case considering a linear tuning between the antigenic stimulation of T cells and that of Tregs.
In this work, we studied immune responses by CD4+ T cells, with the presence of CD4+ Tregs, using
the model initially presented in Burroughs et al. [21] with the asymmetry introduced in Pinto et
al. [57]. In this model, cytokine (e.g. IL-2) dependent growth exhibits a quorum T cell population
threshold that determines if immune responses develop on activation [16, 21]. Secretion inhibition by
Tregs [67] manipulates the growth dynamics and effectively provides a mechanism for tissue specific
regulation of the balance between suppression (control) and immune response. The asymmetry [57]
studied in this paper, is modeled by considering that the secreting T cells have a lower death rate
than the non secreting T cells and that the active Tregs also have a lower death rate than the inactive
Tregs, thus mimicking the effect of the memory T cells. Memory T cells last longer than other T
cells and react more promptly to their specific antigen [62]. With this asymmetry, an increase in the
antigenic stimulation of T cells results in an increase in the population size of T cells - caused both by
the increase in cytokine secretion and by the decrease in the average death rate of T cells, thereby
improving the efficiency of the immune responses [23, 24, 57].
The results presented here deepen the results in [21–25, 54, 57]. In particular, we were able to
obtain exact formulas for the equilibria, and to compute the eigenvalues to determine the stability. In
Section 2.2 we present immune response model as a set of five ordinary differential equations. In
Section 2.3 we present the equilibria of the model where we show the explicit formulas that relate
the concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs, the concentration of interleukine 2 and the
antigenic stimulation of T cells. In Section 2.4 we introduce a linear tuning that models a positive
correlation between the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of Tregs, and
obtain explicit formulas of the equilibria.
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2.2 Theory
We consider the immune response model in Section 3 of Burroughs et al. [23] and Pinto et al. [57],
which uses a population of Tregs and conventional T cells with processes shown schematically in
Figure 2.1. Both populations of cells require antigenic stimulation for activation. Levels of antigenic
Figure 2.1 Model schematic showing growth, death and phenotype transitions of the Treg populations
R,R∗, and autoimmune T cell T,T ∗ populations. Cytokine dynamics are not shown: IL-2 is secreted
by activated T cells T ∗ and adsorbed by all the T cell populations equally. Reproduced from [23].
stimulation are denoted a and b for Tregs and conventional T cells respectively. Tregs are activated
by self antigens from an inactive state, denoted R, to an active state R∗. The IL-2 secreting T cells
are denoted T ∗ and the non secreting T cells are denoted T . On activation, conventional T cells start
secreting IL-2 and acquire proliferative capacity in the presence of IL-2. Tregs also proliferate in
the presence of IL-2 although less efficiently than normal T cells [70], and they do not secrete IL-2.
We include an influx of (auto) immune T cells into the tissue (Tinput) and Tregs (Rinput), which can
represent T cell circulation or naive T cell input from the thymus. We consider that death may occur
independently of other processes or by Fas-FasL induced death [52]. The former terms have equal
values for T cells or Tregs but stimulated T cells and Tregs have a lower death rate than relaxed T
cells and Tregs. The latter (quadratic) term acts as growth limitation mechanism, assumed to act on
all T cells and Tregs equally.
The model consists of a set of ordinary differential equations. We have five compartments: one for
each T cell population - inactive Tregs R, active Tregs R∗, non secreting T cells T , secreting activated
T cells T ∗, and one for interleukin 2 density I.
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Parameter Symbol Range Value
T cell T , T ∗
T cell Maximum growth rate1 ρ
/
α < 6 day−1 4 day−1
Death rate of inactive T cells (day−1) dT 0.1−0.01 [50] 0.1
Death rate ratio of active : inactive T cells dT ∗/dT 0.01−100 0.1
Capacity of T cells2 ρ
/
(αβ ) 106−107 cells/ml [51] 107 cells/ml
Input rate of inactive T cells (cells/ml/day) Tinput 0−104 100
Secretion reversion (constant)3 k hrs-days 0.1 hr−1
Antigen stimulation level bk 0.001-200 ×akˆ Bifurcation parameter
Tregs R, R∗
Growth rate ratio Treg:T ε < 1 0.6
Homeostatic capacity Rhom (ερS
/
dˆ− δˆ )/αˆ 10−105 cells/ml 104 cells/ml
Relaxation rate kˆ hrs-days 0.1 hr−1
Death rate ratio of inactive Tregs : inactive T cells dR
/
dT 0.01−100 1
Death rate relative ratio of Tregs : T cells dR∗dR
/ dT∗
dT
0.01−100 1
Input rate ratio of inactive Tregs : inactive T cells Rinput/Tinput 0−102 1
Treg antigen stimulation level akˆ 0-10 per day 1 per day
Secretion inhibition4 γ 0.1-100 ×R−1hom 10 R−1hom
Cytokines
Max. cytokine concentration5 1
/
α 100-500 pM 200 pM
IL2 secretion rate σ 0.07, 2 fgrms h−1 [71]6 106 molecs s−1 cell−1
Cytokine decay rate σδ hrs-days 1.5 hr −1 [2]
Table 2.1 Parameters values for our model of T cells and Tregs, adopted from [21] and [54].
1Minimum duration of SG2M phase αρ−1 ≈ 3 hrs.
2Maximum T cell density for severe infections (based on LCMV ).
3This is in absence of Tregs.
4This is in terms of the homeostatic Treg level Rhom which is set to 104 cells per ml.
5This is taken as 20 times the receptor affinity (10pM).
6Naive and memory cells respectively. This corresponds to 3×103−105 molecules per h, IL2 mass
15–18 kDa.
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dR
dt
= (ερI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dR)R+ kˆ(R∗−aR)+Rinput ,
dR∗
dt
= (ερI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dR∗)R∗− kˆ(R∗−aR),
dT
dt
= (ρI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dT )T + k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗)+Tinput ,
dT ∗
dt
= (ρI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dT ∗)T ∗− k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗),
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗− (α(R+R∗+T +T ∗)+δ )I).
The parameters of our model and their default values are presented in Table 2.1
2.3 Equilibria of the model
In an ODE model, the equilibria, stable or unstable, is the set of points where all the derivatives vanish.
Let x = T +T ∗ be the total concentration of T cells and let y = R+R∗ be the total concentration of
Tregs. When the system is at equilibrium we have that:
(ερI−β (x+ y)−dR)R+ kˆ(R∗−aR)+Rinput = 0 , (2.1)
(ερI−β (x+ y)−dR∗)R∗− kˆ(R∗−aR) = 0 , (2.2)
(ρI−β (x+ y)−dT )T + k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗)+Tinput = 0 , (2.3)
(ρI−β (x+ y)−dT ∗)T ∗− k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗) = 0 , (2.4)
σ(T ∗− (α(x+ y)+δ )I) = 0 . (2.5)
In Theorem 1 we present rational fractions that, given the concentration of T cells x and the concentra-
tion of Tregs y, allow us to compute the interleukine 2 density I, the concentration of secreting T cells
T ∗, the concentration of active Tregs R∗ and the antigen function b(x,y) that relates the concentration
of T cells x and the concentration of Tregs y with the level of the antigenic stimulation of T cells b.
Moreover, we have obtained a polynomial that gives the exact balance between the concentration
of T cells x and the concentration of Tregs y (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Let A and B be such that
A(x,y) = α(x+ y)+δ and B(x,y) = β (x+ y). Let U , L and M be such that
U(x,y) = (B+dT )x−Tinput ,
L(x,y) = ρx+(dT −dT∗)A,
M(x,y) =
((
B+dR∗+ kˆ(1+a)
)
L− ερU)/kˆa.
Theorem 1. At equilibrium I, T ∗ and R∗ are given by
I(x,y) =
U
L
, T ∗(x,y) = AI, R∗(x,y) =
yL
M
,
and the antigen function b is given by
b(x,y) = (β (x+ y)+dT ∗+ k(1+ γR∗)−ρI)T ∗/(k(x−T ∗)) .
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Figure 2.2 Balance between the concentration of T cells x = T +T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs
y = R+R∗. The figure represents a cross section of the equilibria manifold obtained from Theorem 1
for the default values of the parameters.
Furthermore, the balance between the concentration of T cells and Tregs is given by
(ερUy+L(Rinput − y(B+dR)))M+(dR−dR∗)yL2 = 0 .
We note that the above values of I, T ∗ and R∗ do not depend upon b and are rational functions on
x and y.
Proof. By Equation (2.5), using the definition of A
T ∗ = AI .
In order to eliminate the terms with b, we add Equations (2.3) and (2.4), obtaining
(ρI−B)(T +T ∗)−dT T −dT ∗T ∗+Tinput = 0 .
Noting that x = T +T ∗, we get
(ρT ∗/A−B)x−dT (x−T ∗)−dT ∗T ∗+Tinput = 0 .
Hence,
T ∗ =
((B+dT )x−Tinput)A
ρx+(dT −dT∗)A .
This proves the formulas for I and T ∗.
Let us prove the formula for R∗. Applying y = R+R∗ in Equation (2.2), we get
(ερU/L− (B+dR∗))R∗− kˆ (R∗−a(y−R∗)) = 0 .
Hence,
R∗ =
akˆLy(
B+dR∗+ kˆ(1+a)
)
L− ερU .
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This proves the formula for R∗. By Equation (2.4), noting that x = T +T ∗, we have
(ρI−β (x+ y)−dT ∗)T ∗− k(T ∗−b(x−T ∗)+ γR∗T ∗) = 0 .
Hence,
b = (β (x+ y)+dT ∗+ k(1+ γR∗)−ρI)T ∗/(k(x−T ∗)) .
This proves the formula for b. Let us prove the balance formula. Adding Equations (2.1) and (2.2),
we obtain
(ερI−β (x+ y))y− (dRR+dR∗R∗)+Rinput = 0 .
Hence,
(ερU/L−B)y− (dRy− (dR−dR∗)R∗)+Rinput = 0 .
We computed numerically the eigenvalues (see Figure 2.3) using the Jacobian of the ODE system,
in terms of the pair (x,y), that is given by the following matrix:
J(x,y) = f (R(x,y),R∗(x,y),T (x,y),T ∗(x,y), I(x,y))
=

J11 −βR+ kˆ −βR −βR ερR
−βR∗+ kˆa J22 −βR∗ −βR∗ ερR∗
−βT −βT + kγT ∗ J33 −βT + k+ kγR∗ ρT
−βT ∗ −βT ∗− kγT ∗ −βT ∗+ kb J44 ρT ∗
−σαI −σαI −σαI σ −σαI J55

where
J11 = ερI−β (R+ x+ y)−dR− kˆa,
J22 = ερI−β (R∗+ x+ y)−dR∗− kˆ,
J33 = ρI−β (T + x+ y)−dT − kb,
J44 = ρI−β (T ∗+ x+ y)−dT ∗− k− kγR∗,
J55 = −σ(α(x+ y)+δ ) .
We observe that for the parameters considered, using the balance equation, we have that the con-
centration of Tregs y is also a function of the concentration of T cells x (see Figure 2.2). Hence,
the stability of the equilibria and the bifurcation boundary can be characterized only in terms of the
concentration of T cells x. By Theorem 1, all the equilibria points are characterized in terms of the
pairs (x,y) satisfying the balance equation. Hence, their stability (or instability) is also characterized
in terms of the pairs (x,y) satisfying the balance equation. The bifurcation boundaryB is the set of
equilibria points (R,R∗,T,T ∗, I) with the property that at least one of the eigenvalues has real part
equal to zero and all the other eigenvalues have non positive real part. Therefore, using Theorem 1, the
bifurcation boundaryB can be fully characterized in terms of the pairs (x,y) satisfying the balance
equation. By Theorem 1, the antigenic stimulation of T cells (parameter b) is fully characterized by
the pair (x,y) satisfying the balance equation. Hence, the projection of the bifurcation boundaryB in
the antigenic stimulation of T cells, parameter b, is well characterized, resulting in a lower threshold
bL of antigenic stimulation of T cells and a higher threshold bH of antigenic stimulation of T cells
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Figure 2.3 A: Antigen function b(x,y) that relates the antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentra-
tion of T cells x = T +T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗. The points (bL,xL) and (bH ,xH)
indicate the saddle-node bifurcation points where the stability changes.
B and C: Relation between the eigenvalue with the largest real part (blue line) and the eigenvalue with
the second largest real part (green dashes) with the concentration x of T cells (B) and with the antigenic
stimulation b of T cells (C). For the presented values of the parameters, we observe that the first
eigenvalue is positive for x in (xH ,xL)≈ (2.31×103,3.47×105) and b in (bL,bH)≈ (0.245,0.407);
and that the second eigenvalue is negative.
D: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of T cells x, when
changing the parameter dT ∗/dT between 0.005 and 2, using Theorem 1. Horizontal axis: b; "away
axis": dT ∗/dT ; vertical axis: x = T +T ∗. The colors indicate the stability of the equilibria: yellow
to green for negative eigenvalues; red for eigenvalues close to zero; and blue to black for positive
eigenvalues.
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Figure 2.4 Unfolding of the hysteresis (see also Figure 2.3D). We observe a cusp bifurcation for
dT ∗/dT ≈ 1.71. Inside the bounded region we found 2 stable equilibria and 1 unstable equilibria;
outside of the bounded region we found 1 stable equilibria.
A: Thresholds of antigenic stimulation of T cells, bL (blue) and bH (green).
B: Thresholds of the concentration of T cells, xL (blue) and xH (green).
(see Figures 2.3A and 2.4). For an antigenic stimulation of T cells below the threshold bL, we observe
one stable equilibrium, a controlled state, characterized by a low concentration of T cells. For an
antigenic stimulation of T cells above the threshold bH we observe a stable equilibrium, an immune
response state, characterized by a high concentration of T cells. Between the two antigenic thresholds,
bL and bH we observe two stable equilibria, a controlled state and an immune response state, and
for intermediate concentrations of T cells we observe one unstable equilibrium, that belongs to the
separatrix of the basins of the attraction of the stable equilibria. For the default values of the other
parameters, we observe the unfolding of the hysteresis when we increase the parameter dT ∗/dT from
0.1 up to ≈ 1.71 where a cusp bifurcation occurs.
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2.4 The effect of a linear tuning between the antigenic stimulations of
T cells and Tregs
Here, we consider the same ordinary differencial Equations in Section 2.2 with the addition of a linear
tuning aˆ = a+mb, as in Burroughs et al. [23] and Pinto et al. [57], to model a positive correlation
between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells, and the antigenic stimulation aˆ of Tregs. i.e.
dR
dt
= (ερI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dR)R+ kˆ(R∗−aR−mbR)+Rinput ,
dR∗
dt
= (ερI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dR∗)R∗− kˆ(R∗−aR−mbR),
dT
dt
= (ρI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dT )T + k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗)+Tinput ,
dT ∗
dt
= (ρI−β (R+R∗+T +T ∗)−dT ∗)T ∗− k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗),
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗− (α(R+R∗+T +T ∗)+δ )I).
The equilibria is the set of points such that:
(ερI−β (x+ y)−dR)R+ kˆ(R∗−aR−mbR)+Rinput = 0 , (2.6)
(ερI−β (x+ y)−dR∗)R∗− kˆ(R∗−aR−mbR) = 0 , (2.7)
(ρI−β (x+ y)−dT )T + k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗)+Tinput = 0 , (2.8)
(ρI−β (x+ y)−dT ∗)T ∗− k(T ∗−bT+γR∗T ∗) = 0 , (2.9)
σ(T ∗− (α(x+ y)+δ )I) = 0 . (2.10)
The parameter a = 1/2.4 per day measures the background antigenic stimulation of Tregs when
b = 0, and m is the slope parameter, chosen to be in [0,1]. We present here explicit formulas for the
equilibria, stable or unstable, that relate the concentration of T cells x, the concentration of Tregs y
and the antigenic stimulation of T cells b.
Let A, B, U , L, W , C, E, F , G and H be such that
A(x,y) = α(x+ y)+δ
B(x,y) = β (x+ y)
U(x,y) = (B+dT )x−Tinput
L(x,y) = ρx+(dT −dT ∗)A
W (x,y) = ερU−BL
C(x,y) = dRyL−Wy−RinputL
E(x,y) = (((B+dT ∗+ k)L−ρU)(dR−dR∗)+ kγC)AU
F(x,y) = k(xL−AU)(dR−dR∗)L
G(x,y) = W − (dR∗+ kˆ)L
H(x,y) = kˆ ((dR−dR∗)Ly−C)L
We note that the functions A,B,U and L are the same as the ones presented in Section 2.3.
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Theorem 2. At equilibrium I, T ∗ and R∗ are given by
I(x,y) =
U
L
, T ∗(x,y) = AI, R∗(x,y) =
C
(dR−dR∗)L
and the antigen function b is given by
b(x,y) =
E
F
.
Furthermore, the balance between the concentration of T cells and Tregs is given by
CFG+(aF +mE)H = 0 .
Proof. By Equation (2.10), using the definition of A
T ∗ = AI .
Adding Equations (2.8) and (2.9) we obtain
(ρI−B)(T +T ∗)−dT T −dT ∗T ∗+Tinput = 0 .
Noting that x = T +T ∗, we get
(ρT ∗/A−B)x−dT (x−T ∗)−dT ∗T ∗+Tinput = 0 .
Hence,
T ∗ =
((B+dT )x−Tinput)A
ρx+(dT −dT∗)A .
This proves the formulas for I and T ∗.
To prove the formula for R∗, we add Equations (2.6) and (2.7), obtaining
(ερI−β (x+ y))y−dRR−dR∗R∗+Rinput = 0 .
Nothing that y = R+R∗ and using the definition of B and I we get(
ερ
U
L
−B
)
y−dRy+(dR−dR∗)R∗+Rinput = 0 .
Multiplying by L and using the definition of C we have
−C+(dR−dR∗)LR∗ = 0 .
Now, let us prove the formula for b. From Equation (2.9) and noting that x = T +T ∗ we obtain
b =
((B+dT ∗+ k−ρI)+ kγR∗)T ∗
k(x−T ∗) .
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Using the expressions for I and T ∗, and multiplying the numerator and denominator by L
b =
(((B+dT ∗+ k)L−ρU)+ kγLR∗)AU
k(xL−AU)L .
Using the equation for R∗ and multiplying the numerator and the denominator by (dR−dR∗)
b =
(((B+dT ∗+ k)L−ρU)(dR−dR∗)+ kγC)AU
k(xL−AU)(dR−dR∗)L .
Let us prove the balance equation between x and y. Applying y = R+R∗ and the definition of B
and I in Equation (2.7), we get
(ερU/L−B−dR∗)R∗− kˆR∗+ kˆa(y−R∗)+ kˆmb(y−R∗) = 0 .
Multiplying by L
(
ερU−BL− (dR∗+ kˆ)L
)
R∗+ kˆ
(
a+m
E
F
)
(y−R∗)L = 0 .
Using the expressions for G and R∗
CG
(dR−dR∗)L + kˆ
(
aF +mE
F
)(
y− C
(dR−dR∗)L
)
L = 0 .
We finish the proof by dividing the above equation by (dR−dR∗)LF and using the definition of H.
After obtaining the equilibria, we can assess the stability by computing numerically the eigenvalues
using the Jacobian of the ODE system given by
J(x,y) = f (R(x,y),R∗(x,y),T (x,y),T ∗(x,y), I(x,y))
=

J11 −βR+ kˆ −βR −βR ερR
−βR∗+ kˆ(a+mb) J22 −βR∗ −βR∗ ερR∗
−βT −βT + kγT ∗ J33 −βT + k+ kγR∗ ρT
−βT ∗ −βT ∗− kγT ∗ −βT ∗+ kb J44 ρT ∗
−σαI −σαI −σαI σ −σαI J55

where
J11 = ερI−β (R+ x+ y)−dR− kˆ(a+mb),
J22 = ερI−β (R∗+ x+ y)−dR∗− kˆ,
J33 = ρI−β (T + x+ y)−dT − kb,
J44 = ρI−β (T ∗+ x+ y)−dT ∗− k− kγR∗,
J55 = −σ(α(x+ y)+δ ) .
We observe that the balance between the concentration of T cells and the concentration of Tregs varies
with the slope parameter m. For low values of the slope parameter m, we obtain an hysteresis with its
bistability region. As we further increase the slope parameter m, we find up to three possible values of
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the concentration of the Tregs for each value of the concentration of the T cells.
When we increase the slope parameter from 0 to 1, we observe that the hysteresis changes slightly in
shape but not in the number of equilibria. At m = 5.7×10−3 we observe the appearance of a single
point, an isola, a saddle-node equilibria for b = 1.3×102 > bH and x = 1.0×103.
As we further increase the slope m, we observe that the isola increases. The isola presents a stable
equilibria for lower concentrations of T cells and an unstable equilibria for higher concentration of
T cells. It eventually reaches the hysteresis for m = 4.1× 10−2 creating a transcritical bifurcation
at b = 1.0 and x = 1.0×103. For larger values of the slope m we observe a hysteresis considerably
wider than the one obtained for m close to zero.
A B C
Figure 2.5 Cross section of the equilibria manifold obtained from Theorem 2 for the default values
of the parameters and with the slope parameter m = 0, equal to the model without tuning. A:
Balance between the concentration of T cells x = T +T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗.
B: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of T cells
x = T +T ∗. C: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of
Tregs y = R+R∗.
A B C
Figure 2.6 Cross section of the equilibria manifold obtained from Theorem 2 for the default values
of the parameters and with the slope parameter m≈ 5.7×10−3, appearance of the isola. A: Balance
between the concentration of T cells x = T + T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗. B:
Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of T cells x =
T +T ∗. C: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of Tregs
y = R+R∗.
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A B C
Figure 2.7 Cross section of the equilibria manifold obtained from Theorem 2 for the default values
of the parameters and with the slope parameter m = 7.0× 10−3, appearance of a loop from the
isola. A: Balance between the concentration of T cells x = T +T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs
y = R+R∗. B: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of T
cells x = T +T ∗. C: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration
of Tregs y = R+R∗.
A B C
Figure 2.8 Cross section of the equilibria manifold obtained from Theorem 2 for the default values of
the parameters and with the slope parameter m around 4.1×10−2, a transcritical bifurcation occurs
at b≈ 1,x≈ 6×103,y≈ 6×103. A: Balance between the concentration of T cells x = T +T ∗ and
the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗. B: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
and the concentration of T cells x = T +T ∗. C: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T
cells and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗.
A B C
Figure 2.9 Cross section of the equilibria manifold obtained from Theorem 2 for the default values
of the parameters and with the slope parameter m = 1, with a considerably wider hysteresis. A:
Balance between the concentration of T cells x = T +T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗.
B: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of T cells
x = T +T ∗. C: Relationship between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the concentration of
Tregs y = R+R∗.
Chapter 3
Convergence to Walrasian prices in
random matching Edgeworthian
economies with bounded rationality
3.1 Introduction
General equilibrium analysis is widely used in modern economics, it gives us insights as to what
we can expect, in economic terms, from the complex interaction between participants, markets, and
institutions, in a social medium. It was brought to attention following the work of Walras in the 1870s
who first stated the theory of exchange in its generality [74], and the work of Edgeworth [31] who
stated the theory of market behavior, and was the first to study the core, under the name ’contract
curve’. These interactions have influence not only on the individual markets but also on the aggregate
economy. The theorems of welfare economics by Arrow [3] imply that the distortion of relative
commodity prices will have a social cost when analyzed using a general equilibrium model, since
policies such as taxes and tariffs could move the economy away from a Pareto optimal allocation, with
costly effects.
General equilibrium analysis attempts to explain the behavior of markets: behavior of demand, supply,
and prices, by seeking to prove that the interaction of demand and supply will result in a general
equilibrium. Arrow and Debreu [5] suggested that under certain economic assumptions such as convex
preferences, independence of demand and perfect competition there must be a set of prices such that
aggregate supply equals aggregate demand for every commodity in the economy.
The Walrasian general equilibrium model assumes that consumers are passive price takers - they
regard a given set of prices as parameters in determining their optimal net demands and supplies. The
equilibrium price is such that the market clears, then the consumers change their endowments by the
allocations determined by the equilibrium price. A mechanism that leads to the equilibrium price can
be achieved, for instance, through an auctioneer who collects all the offers and demands for each good
and adjusts the price vector to clear the market. Here, each consumer has an initial endowment of
the commodities and a set of preferences, resulting in demand functions for each commodity, where
market demand is the sum of consumers’ demands. The Commodity market demands depend on all
18
3.1 Introduction 19
prices, and are continuous, nonnegative, homogeneous of degree zero, and satisfy Walras’s law (i.e. at
any set of prices, the total value of consumer expenditures equals consumer incomes). Consumers
maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, producers (in models with production) maximize
profits. In equilibrium, market prices are such that the required equilibrium conditions hold; demand
equals supply for all commodities, and on the production side (for models with production) zero profit
conditions are satisfied for each industry. On the other hand, the Edgeworthian concept considers
consumers as active market participants trading with each other in an attempt to reach a higher level
of utility. According to this point of view, an equilibrium is achieved when no person participating in
the market can become better off without another person becoming worse off.
The study of market games has been an outstanding problem in the field of economics, and math-
ematical economics in particular. One of the objectives is to provide a market game which can
approximately enough describe the behavior of participants and of markets in real situations such
that the equilibrium of this approximate market approaches the competitive equilibrium of the same
market. A popular approach is the use of random matching games where participants meet randomly
and exchange goods according to some set rules. Many researchers developed the work in these
directions, among them Binmore and Herrero [11], Shaked and Sutton [66], Rubinstein and Wolinsky
[61], MasColell [47], McLennan and Schonnesschein [49], Wooders [75], Lloyd [46], Dubey and
Geanokoplos [29], Harves-Beloso et al. [39], Levin [45], Voorneveld [73], and Gale [33–36].
In order to isolate the effect of market rules from the participants’ behavior, Gode and Sunder [37, 38]
introduced ’zero intelligence’ programs in place of human traders, where programs submit offers and
bids randomly, subject to a budget constraint. They showed that a double auction, a non-Walrasian
market mechanism, can sustain high level of allocative efficiency even if participants do not maximize
profit, suggesting that allocative efficiency of a double auction is derived largely from its structure
(market rules imposed on participants), independent of trader’s motivation, intelligence or learning.
With the help of Gale’s results [36], Pinto et al. [58] showed that for a class of random matching
Edgeworth economies with two goods and participants, with preferences, described by Cobb-Douglas
utility, the expectation of the limiting equilibrium price coincides with the equilibrium price of the
related Walrasian economies. Furthermore, Pinto et al. [58] extended the results to study economies
in the presence of uncertainty within the framework of multi-period Arrow-Debreu model in order to
show how beliefs survive and propagate through markets, providing a framework on which to study
markets in which there is no enough data that will enable detailed study to predict the probability
of future states. Ferreira et al. [32] extended the model of Pinto et al. [58] by associating to each
participant a bargaining skill (or a selfishness) factor, allowing trade to occur to a point in the core
different from the bilateral equilibrium. In this work, we extended the work in Pinto et al [58], and
Ferreira et al [32] by allowing trade to occur outside the core, inspired by the ’zero intelligence’
participants of Gode and Sunder [37, 38]. We studied conditions under which the equilibrium of
the market, defined by a random matching game as in Binmore and Herrero [12], approaches the
equilibrium of a fully competitive Walrasian model. The chapter is divided into four sections, section
3.2 presents a description of the general equilibrium model, section 3.3 explains the duality concepts,
and section 3.4 has our main result.
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3.2 Economic model
We look at a dynamic matching and bargaining game G = {(Zi,ei,ui)}Ni=1, where each participant has
a consumption set Zi ⊂ RM+ , a consumption bundle ei and a utility function ui. We will consider the
case of two goods being traded, i.e. M = 2, zi = (xi,yi)∈R2+ and utility function of the Cobb-Douglas
type:
ui(xi,yi) = x
αi
i y
1−αi
i ; with preference αi . (3.1)
Let A = {A1,A2, ...,AN} be a collection of N participants. Participants Ai have preferences αi. Some
given amounts of goods, each with positive price p > 0 are distributed among the N participants,
such that participant Ai owns an initial endowment (xi,yi) of goods x and y. The marginal rate of
substitution MRS of participant Ai is given by
MRS(Ai) =
∂ui(Ai)
∂xi
∂ui(Ai)
∂yi
.
From Equation 3.1 we obtain
∂ui
∂xi
=
αi
xi
ui ,
∂ui
∂yi
=
(1−αi)
yi
ui .
Hence,
MRS(Ai) =
αi
xi
1−αi
yi
=
αiyi
(1−αi)xi .
Since participants have different endowments and preferences, then there may be gains from trading.
Thus, participants may exchange commodities in order to maximize their preferences. Ideally, given a
price vector p, each participant would choose a consumption to maximize her utility given her budget
constraint. Therefore, participant Ai would solve the problem
maxz∈R2+ui(z) such that p.z≤ p.ei . (3.2)
3.2.1 The Walrasian Equilibrium
A Walrasian equilibrium is a vector of prices, and a consumption bundle for each agent, such that
every agent’s consumption maximizes her utility given prices, and the market clears: the total demand
for each commodity equals the aggregate endowment.
Definition 1. A Walrasian equilibrium for the economy G is a vector consisting of the price and final
allocations (p,zi) such that:
1.
For all i, zi ∈ argmax
p.zi≤p.ei
ui(z)
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2.
For all i, ∑
i
zi =∑
i
ei
Therefore, a competitive equilibrium consists of a price structure p at which the total supply of each
commodity balances the total demand, and the allocation z that results from trading at these prices
is the equilibrium allocation. I.e. z here is an allocation with the property that at the price structure
p, no participant can, within the value of his initial bundle, buy a bundle that he prefers to z. If no
coalition of participants can enforce an outcome that is better for them than z, then z is said to be in the
core of the market. Hence, the core is the set of Pareto-optimal points not blocked by any participant.
The notion of competitive equlibria holds only when there is perfect competition, otherwise the
decision of one participant can change prevailing prices such that the restrictions on the prices will
not hold. On the other hand, the notion of the core does not depend on perfect competition, it can
hold even for markets consisting of two or three participants. It involves only direct trading between
participants, against the notion of competitive equilibrium which assumes that traders allow market
pressure to determine prices, and then trade passively according to these prices. Even though every
equilibrium allocation is always in the core, the core of a finite market usually contains points that
are not equilibrium allocations. Aumann [8] showed that the core approaches the set of equilibrium
allocations when the number of participants approaches infinity.
When participants follow Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Walrasian equilibrium price pW deter-
mines the unique point in the core such that the market "locally" clears:
pW (A ) =
∑Ni=1αiyi
∑Ni=1(1−αi)xi
. (3.3)
3.2.2 The bilateral equilibrium
Bilateral trade is the trade between two participants Ai and A j. The case with two commodities, x and
y, is the well known scenario analyzed in the Edgeworth box diagram represented in Figure 3.1.
We represent in the Edgeworth box, the indifference curves for both participants, i.e. the curves of
constant utility, ui = constant and u j = constant, passing through the point corresponding to the initial
endowments of both participants. Since we are using Cobb-Douglas utility function, the indifference
curve for participant Ai has the formula
y = yi
(
x
xi
) αi
1−αi
.
The contract curve is the curve where the indifference curves of both participants are tangent and such
that the utilities of both participants are greater than or equal to the initial ones. It is the set of all
Pareto-optimal allocations, where the condition for Pareto-optimality is that both participants have
equal values of the marginal rate of substitution. Hence, at the contract curve, neither participant can
improve her utility without worsening the utility of the other participant. In our model, the contract
curve is
y =
(1−αi)α j (yi+ y j)x
αi (1−α j)(xi+ x j)+(α j−αi)x .
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Figure 3.1 Edgeworth Box: The horizontal axis represents the amount of good x and the vertical
axis represents the amount of good y of participant Ai. The point O j = (xi+ x j,yi+ y j) is the vertex
opposite to the origin. The horizontal and vertical lines starting at the opposite vertex are the axes
representing the amounts of good x and y, respectively, of participant A j. Participant Ai has the
minimum possible allocation at the origin Oi = (0,0) and has a maximum allocation at O j. The
indifference curve for participant Ai is the blue convex curve and for participant A j is the green
concave curve. The red dots connecting Oi to O j is the contract curve and the red curve connecting
the two indifference curves is the core. The slope of the pink segment line is the bilateral equilibrium
price. The interception point (A) of the core with the pink segment line determines the new allocations
and the square (E) marks the initial endowments. Reproduced from [58].
The core is the subset of the contract curve such that the utility of both participants is greater than or
equal to their initial utility. The bilateral equilibrium price b is the Walrasian price restricted to the
market with these two participants. I.e. when N = 2 in Equation 3.3 we obtain
b =
αiyi+α jy j
(1−αi)xi+(1−α j)x j .
The bilateral price determines a segment of allocations that pass through the point corresponding
to the initial endowments. The interception of this segment with the core determines the new al-
locations: the bilateral equilibrium (xˆi, yˆi) = (αi (xi+ yi/b) ,(1−αi)(yi+bxi)) of the two participants.
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3.3 Duality
We follow the concept of statistical duality introduced in the previous work by Pinto et al [58]. It
guarantees that the prices observed in the random matching Edgeworthian economy coincide in
expectation with those of the Walrasian economy. This happens because it imposes on each participant
a dual (mirror) participant with opposite preference, and symmetric initial endowments. We begin by
presenting the concept of duality and some properties of the model.
Let participants A and B be participants from A , having utility functions of the Cobb-Douglas type.
Participant A has preference α ∈ (0,1) and endowments (x,y) ∈ R2+, and participant B has preference
α ′ ∈ (0,1) and endowments (x′,y′) ∈ R2+. We will abbreviate as A = (α,x,y) and B = (α ′,x′,y′). Let
p ∈ R+.
Definition 2. The p-dual of participant A, denoted A¯, has preference α¯ = 1−α and endowments
(x¯, y¯) =
(
y
p , px
)
∈ R2+
Proposition 1. The p-dual participant A¯ will have a logarithm of its marginal rate of substitution that
is symmetric with respect to ln p to the marginal rate of substitution of participant A:
ln(MRS(A¯)) = 2ln p− ln(MRS(A)) .
Hence, when participant A has a MRS equal to (or above or below) p, her dual will have a MRS
equal to (or below or above) p.
Proof. The utility of A¯ is given by
u(A¯) =
(
y
p
)1−α
(px)α .
Hence,
u
(
A¯
)
= p2α−1u(A) .
Computing the marginal rate of substitution of A¯, we have
MRS(A¯) =
∂u(A¯)
∂ x¯
∂u(A¯)
∂ y¯
.
The derivatives are
∂u(A¯)
∂ x¯
= α¯
u(A¯)
x¯
and
∂u(A¯)
∂ y¯
= (1− α¯)u(A¯)
y¯
.
Hence, the marginal rate of substitution is
MRS(A¯) =
α¯ y¯
(1− α¯)x¯ .
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Using Definition 2, we get
MRS(A¯) =
(1−α)px
αy/p
=
p2
MRS(A)
.
The proof is concluded by applying logarithm to the last equation.
After participants A and B meet, their new allocations will move them to, respectively, Atr =
(α,x+∆x,y−∆y) and Btr = (α ′,x′−∆x,y′+∆y), with (∆x,∆y) ∈ R2.
We note that either ∆x and ∆y have the same sign, i.e. ∆x∆y > 0; or they are both zero when trade does
not occur, i.e. (∆x,∆y) = (0,0). Moreover, in the former case we interpret as participant A giving an
amount ∆y and receiving in exchange an amount ∆x, if both ∆x and ∆y are positive; or the reverse, if
both are negative. Furthermore, we define the trading price as
ptr =
∆y
∆x
.
Definition 3. The eye-shaped region of possible trade between participants A and B in R2+ is the
region of trade that does not decrease the utility of either participant:
eye(A,B) = {(∆x,∆y) ∈ R2 : u(Atr)≥ u(A) and u(Btr)≥ u(B)} .
The eye-shaped region is the intersection between the area above the indifference curve of
participant Ai in Figure 3.1 and the area below the indifference curve of participant A j. Let p > 0,
let (∆x,∆y) be in R2, and let the map mp : R2 → R2 be mp(∆x,∆y) =
(
∆y
p , p∆x
)
. Let A and B be two
participants from A . Lemma 1 states that the eye-shaped region of the p-dual participants A¯ and B¯ is
obtained by applying the map mp to the eye-shaped region of A and B.
Lemma 1. Let A and B be two participants from A . The eye-shaped region of the p-duals of A and B
is mp (eye(A,B)), i.e. for all (∆x,∆y) ∈ eye(A,B)
mp(∆x,∆y) =
(
∆y
p
, p∆x
)
∈ eye(A¯, B¯) .
Proof. We need to prove that for all (∆x,∆y) ∈ eye(A,B) which does not decrease the utility of neither
A nor B, will imply that the trade mp(∆x,∆y) does not decrease the utility of neither A¯ nor B¯.
By Definition 3, if (∆x,∆y) ∈ eye(A,B) then
u
(
Atr
)≥ u(A) . (3.4)
Therefore
(x+∆x)α (y−∆y)1−α ≥ xαy1−α .
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After A¯ and B¯ trade, the utility of A¯tr is
u
(
A¯tr
)
= u
(
1−α, y−∆y
p
, p(x+∆x)
)
.
Applying the Cobb-Douglas utility function
u
(
A¯tr
)
=
(
y−∆y
p
)1−α
(p(x+∆x))α .
The inequality in Equation 3.4 implies that
u
(
A¯tr
)≥ ( y
p
)1−α
(px)α .
Hence,
u
(
A¯tr
)≥ u(A¯) .
A similar result is obtained for the p-dual of participant B. Therefore, if (∆x,∆y)∈ eye(A,B),
(
∆y
p , p∆x
)
must belong to eye(A¯, B¯).
The p-statistical duality
Consider a collection of participants A with preferences αi, and endowments (xi,yi). The probability
density function f (αi,xi,yi), on the (αi,xi,yi) space (0,1)×R2+, provides the probability that a
participant Ai has preferences in (αi,αi + dαi)× (xi,xi + dx)× (yi,yi + dy). We assume that the
probability distribution has compact support, and the support in (xi,yi) is bounded away from zero.
P-statistical duality probability density function
We will use the p-statistical duality of the market as defined by Pinto et al. [58]. Let p ∈ R+.
Definition 4 (Pinto et al. [58]). A market satisfies the p - statistical market duality condition if for
any participant A ∈A and its dual A¯ ∈A the probability density function has the symmetry property
f (A) = f (A¯) .
The p-statistical duality property means that each participant with characteristics (α,x,y) has a
mirror participant with characteristics (1−α,y/p, px) with the same probability density under f . An
example of functions that satisfy the p-statistical duality are the class of functions f (α,x,y) of the
form f1(α) f2(x,y) with the property that f1 is symmetric on preferences f1(α) = f1(1−α) and f2 is
p-symmetric in endowments f2(x,y) = f2(y/p, px).
Let us denote the initial random choice of participants by ωA , and define the initial choice of
participants that will be able to trade by the random variable A (ωA ) = {A1,A2, · · ·AN}.
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Proposition 2. If a market satisfies the p-statistical market duality, the expectation of logarithm of
the marginal rate of substitution over all possible distributions of participants A(ωA ) is p:
E(lnMRS(A)) = ln p .
Proof. Since any participant and its dual have the same probability of being selected, and the market
duality holds, then E(lnMRS(A¯)) must be equal to E(lnMRS(A)). The proof is concluded by apply-
ing Proposition 1 and reorganizing the terms.
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3.4 Deviating from the bilateral equilibrium
We will consider a model where participants meet in pairs and have a limited view of the world. The
pair might be unable to choose rationally their optimal trade that will bring them to their bilateral
equilibrium. They are bounded to select trades that do not decrease their respective utility. This model
is inspired by the constrained zero-intelligent participants as described by Gode and Sunder [39].
Each participant is limited by her current utility, but other than that, they may have zero intelligence:
their choice of trade may be random. Hence, after trade, the participants may end in a point inside the
eye-shaped region in figure 3.1 that is different from their bilateral equilibrium (point A).
Besides the duality in the participants, in this chapter we also assume that participants’ choice of trade
has a symmetric distribution. The p-statistical trading duality means that given a pair and its dual, it is
as likely that the pair ends up with some allocations as is likely that its dual end up with the mirror
allocations.
Definition 5. We say that the trade satisfies the p-statistical trading duality if the probability density
function q has the symmetry property, for all A and B and for all (∆x,∆y) ∈ eye(A,B),
qA,B(∆x,∆y) = qA¯,B¯
(
∆y
p
, p∆x
)
.
Remark 1. If trade occurs and it follows the p-statistical trading duality, the logarithm of the price of
a trade done between participants A and B is log-p-symmetric to the logarithm of price of the p-dual
trade done between their p-duals A¯ and B¯, even if q depends explicitly on the past and on which
participants are being selected. Therefore, we have that ln p¯tr = 2ln p− ln ptr . In particular, if A and
B trade at the price ptr = p, then their duals will also trade at price p.
Proof.
ln
(
p∆x
∆y
p
)
= ln
(
p2
∆x
∆y
)
= 2ln p− ln(ptr) .
Using these properties, we can expand the result by Pinto et al. [58] to the case where trade may
deviate form the bilateral equilibrium as long as we impose that the duals trade following a properly
symmetric distribution.
In order to prove our results, we need to assume that there is at least one participant that has a positive
probability of trading with any other participant. Our choice of f and q will be such that it exists
a value ε > 0 such that Any participant B that we may chose will determine a region τε inside of
eye(A,B), where trade increases the utility of at least one of the participants with τε being defined as
τε = {(∆x,∆y) ∈ eye(A,B) : u
(
Atr
)
u
(
Btr
)
> (1+ ε)u(A)u(B)}.
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The region τε is such that there is a sufficiently high probability of A and B trading:
Pr(A,B)≥
∫
τε
qA,B(∆x,∆y)> ε .
Remark 2. Since participant A is "willing" to trade with everyone else, we could use as a simplified
restriction a condition applied to B:
τε = {(∆x,∆y) ∈ eye(A,B) : u
(
Btr
)
> (1+ ε)u(B)} .
We note that either definitions of τε do not contain the region ε-near (0,0), where no trade occurs
and will not contain the "opposite" corner of the eye-shaped region, the region ε-near the other
interception of the two indifference curves. One possible choice of q that follows this assumptions is
q being the uniform distribution inside the eye-shaped region and zero outside of it. Other possibility
would be to consider that q is such that the bilateral equilibrium is chosen with probability 1, that
would correspond to the original model by Pinto et al. [58]. Another example would be to select a
point in the core, as presented in [32] by Ferreira et al., that is as a function of a selfishness type, also
called bargaining skill or greediness type, that depends only on the participants chosen but not on their
endowments, preferences, or history.
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3.5 Random matching market
As in Pinto et al. [58], we consider a market where N participants are picked at random according
to a given probability distribution f which satisfies the p-statistical duality. Each participant Ai has
preference αi and initial endowments (xi(0),yi(0)). Let p(ωA ) be the Walrasian equilibrium price of
the market for this collection A (ωA ) of N participants, and E[ln(pωA )] be the expectation of the
logarithm of the Walrasian equilibrium price p(ωA ) computed with respect to the initial consumption
bundles of the participants over all the initial collections A (ωA ) of N participants. At each time
instant t, a random pair i, j will be matched, with all pairs having the same probability of being
selected. After t trades participants Ai and A j have consumption bundles (xi(t),yi(t)) and (x j(t),y j(t))
respectively. At this instant, the pair i, j trades (∆x(t),∆y(t)) ∈ eye(i, j) ⊂ R2, according to the
probability density function q that follows the p-statistical trading duality. After these trades we have
that
xi(t+1) = xi(t)+∆x(t), yi(t+1) = yi(t)−∆y(t),
x j(t+1) = x j(t)−∆x(t), y j(t+1) = y j(t)+∆y(t),
with trade either occurring at a price p(t) = ∆y∆x > 0, or they decide not to exchange goods, thus
∆x = ∆y = 0. The consumption bundles of all the other participants Ak ̸= Ai,A j remain unchanged,
i.e. (xk(t+1),yk(t+1)) = (xk(t),yk(t)).
Let ω¯r be the infinite sequence of participants selected to trade at each instant in time. The vari-
able ω¯r = (ω¯r(1), ω¯r(2), · · ·), where ω¯r(t) = (Ai(t),A j(t)), includes information about the pair
(Ai(t),A j(t)), Ai(t) ̸= A j(t), corresponding to the pair of participants (Ai(t),A j(t)) that have been
randomly chosen to trade at time t. Let ω¯g be the infinite sequence ω¯g = (ω¯g(1), ω¯g(2), · · ·), where
ω¯g(t) = (∆x(t),∆y(t)) is the variable that includes the amounts traded. If both ∆x(t)> 0 and ∆y(t)> 0,
we consider that participant i(t) received ∆x(t) and gave ∆y(t) to participant j(t). We note that each
pair of quantities traded (∆x,∆y) in ω¯g must belong to the eye-shaped region of the pair selected in
that instant in time. Thus, the choice of possible values for (∆x,∆y) is dependent on the history, in
particular, it depends on ωA , ω¯r and ω¯g restricted to that moment in time t. However, the probability
density function q is only a function of the current state of the matched participants. Moreover, the
participants choice of trade is not dependent on future outcomes of either participants. A full run of
the game is the sequence ωA ω¯rω¯g that is an initial choice of participants and an infinite sequence
of random matchings and quantities exchanged. Following from our assumption, the participants
will trade an infinite number of times. Since when ∆x(t) = 0 and ∆y(t) = 0 the market is unchanged;
we will only consider the infinite subsequence of ωA ω¯rω¯g such that the instants t at which no trade
occurred ∆x(t) = 0 and ∆y(t) = 0 were removed. This subsequence will be denoted by ωA ωrωg. A
finite time run of the game is the sequence ωA ωrωg|t, where ωrωg|t is the restriction of ωrωg for the
first t random matches.
Let ptr(t,ωA ωrωg) be the trading price of the trade at time t determined by the finite run ωA ωrωg|t.
Let E[ln ptr(t,ωA ωrωg)] be the expected value of the logarithm of ptr(t,ωA ωrωg) over all initial
collections A (ωA ) of participants and over the first t random meetings that trade amounts given
by the first values t of the random variable ωg. By Gale [36] the limiting price ptr(ωA ωrωg) =
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limt→∞ ptr(t,ωA ωrωg) exists almost surely and it is a random variable dependent on the sequence of
matches of the participants and on the amounts traded. Let E[ln ptr(ωA ωrωg)] be the expected value
of the logarithm of the limiting price p(ωA ωrωg) when t → ∞ over all the possible distributions of
the participantsA (ωA ) and over all random matchings ωr and over all possible trades ωg. Expanding
the results from Pinto et al. [58], we can prove that also in this market the duality determines the
expectation of the logarithm of the Walrasian price of the initial market and the expectation of the
logarithm of the trading price.
Theorem 3 (p-statistical duality fixed point). Assume a market G consisting of a finite number of
participants, such that p-statistical market duality holds for the initial endowments and the p-statistical
trading duality holds, then for all t ∈ {1,2, · · · ,+∞}
E[ln ptr(t,ωA ωrωg)] = E[ln pW (ωA )] = ln p .
Furthermore,
E[ln ptr(ωA ωrωg)] = ln p .
In Theorem 3, the advantage of using the logarithm of the price is that the duals trade at the
symmetric value with the same probability. In particular, Theorem 3 is a fixed point theorem for the
expected value E[ln ptr(t,ωA ωrωg)] that is constant along time t. Furthermore, and similarly as stated
in Pinto et al [58], this result holds even when n(t) ≥ 2 participants trade simultaneously, and are
selected with a non-uniform probability distribution, provided the trading duality condition and the
trading assumptions 1 and 2 are properly adjusted.
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof follows the steps in Pinto et al. [58]. We begin by using Gale’s Lemma which follows
from Proposition 3, Chapter 1 of [36]. The proof that E[ln pW (ωA)] = ln p follows directly from
Pinto et al. [58]. We identify participant Ai at time t, hereafter denoted by Ai(t), with (αi,xi(t),yi(t))
consisting of her preference and her amounts of goods x and y at time t. We write A¯i(t) = A j(t) to
state that participant Ai(t) at time t is dual to participant A j(t) at time t, i.e., when α j = 1−αi, and
(xi(t),yi(t)) = (y j(t)/p, px j(t)).
Proof. Suppose that we have two initial sets of participants
A = {A1,A2, · · · ,AN},
B = {B1,B2 · · · ,BN},
such that every participant Bi = A¯i is the dual participant of Ai. Choose a run of the play ωr. Let
(∆x,∆y) be the amounts traded by the pair (Ai,A j) at time t, with either ∆x∆y ≥ 0 or ∆x = 0 and
∆y = 0, with probability density qAi,A j(∆x,∆y). If trade occurred, its price is given by
ptr(t,ωA ωrωg) = pi j(t) =
∆y
∆x
.
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Our duality conditions mean that the dual pair (A¯i, A¯ j) will trade the dual quantities ∆x= ∆yp , ∆y= p∆x
with the same probability density
q¯A¯i(t),A¯ j(t)(∆x¯,∆y) = qAi(t),A j(t)(∆x,∆y) .
Hence, the dual trade occurred at price
∆y¯
∆x¯
=
p∆x
∆y
p
=
p2
pi j
(t) .
After the trade at time t+1, the probability density of the participants (Ai,A j) having allocations
xi(t+1) = xi(t)+∆x = x∗i ,
yi(t+1) = yi(t)−∆y = y∗i ,
is equal to the probability density of the dual pair of participants (Bi,B j) = (A¯i, A¯ j) having the dual
allocations
x¯i(t+1) = x¯i+∆x¯ = x¯∗i =
y∗i
p
,
y¯i(t+1) = y¯i−∆y¯ = y¯∗i = px∗i , (3.5)
with similar expressions for j.
We observe from Equation 3.5 that if A and B follow the same sequence ωr, we must have that
Bi(t) = A¯i(t) for all i. Therefore, the trading prices are equal
p
(
A¯i(t+1), A¯ j(t+1)
)
= p(Bi(t+1),B j(t+1)) . (3.6)
Which means that the random dynamical system defined by Equation (3.5) is equivariant under the
duality transformations.
Therefore, the market duality and the trading duality allow us to map each run of the economy
ω =ωA ωrωg to a dual run ω¯ = ω¯A ω¯rω¯g with the same probability Pr(ωA ωrωg|t) = Pr(ω¯A ω¯rω¯g|t).
Therefore, by Equation (3.6), the statistical duality is invariant over time. Again, by Equation (3.6),
we obtain that
ln pi j(t,ωAωrωg)+ ln p¯i j(t,ωAωrωg)
= ln pi j(t,ωAωrωg)+ ln
p2
pi j(t,ωAωrωg)
= ln pi j(t,ωAωrωg)+2ln p− ln pi j(t,ωAωrωg)
= 2ln p, (3.7)
which implies, by statistical duality, that
E[ln ptr(t,ω)] = ln p, ∀ t ∈ N .
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We note that Equation (3.5) implies the invariance of the expectation of the marginal rate of substitution
for dual pairings. Let us assume that MRS(A¯i) = p2/MRS(Ai) holds at time t. Then, at time t +1,
after pair i and j traded (∆x,∆y) ∈ R2+ we have that
MRS(Ai)(t+1) =
αi(yi−∆y)
(1−αi)(xi+∆x) .
Her p-dual will have her MRS symmetric with respect to ln p, hence, the expected value over ωA,ωr
and ωg of lnMRS will be fixed over time.
Now, let us consider t = ∞. There exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that for all t, we have that
| ln ptr(t,ωA ωrωg) |≤ K almost surely,
provided |ln ptr(t,ωAωrωg)|< K for some K = 2lnk,
where k is a constant.
The boundedness of the price follows from the assumption that all the distribution of endowments
for the participants has compact support which is bounded away from 0 for all t. Then by a direct
application of Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem we have that
E
[
lim
t→∞ ln ptr(t,ωA ωrωg)
]
= lim
t→∞E [ln p(t,ωA ωrωg)] = E[ln p(ωA ωrωg)],
from which follows that
E[ln ptr(ωA ωrωg)] = E[ln pW (ωA )] = ln p .
Chapter 4
General Conclusion
In this work we applied concepts of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory to immunology, in Chapter
2, on one hand and to random exchange economies on the other hand, in Chapter 3.
We studied a model of immune response by CD4+ T cells with CD4+ Tregs with asymmetric death
rates. We expanded previous results [21–25, 54, 57] by presenting explicit formulas that give the
relation at equilibria (stable or unstable) between the concentration x of T cells, Tregs, IL-2 cytokines
and the antigenic stimulation b of T cells. The relation between the concentration of T cells and
their antigenic stimulation is a hysteresis. Between the two thresholds bL and bH of antigenic
stimulation of T cells, the hysteresis has a bounded region of bistability (containing also one unstable
equilibrium). For the default values of our parameters, we observed an unfold of the hysteresis for
dT ∗/dT = 1.71. When we considered a linear tuning between the antigenic stimulations of T cells
and Tregs, we observed a change in behavior with the slope parameter m. When we changed the
slope parameter we found the appearance of an isola, a saddle-node equilibria. The isola reaches the
hysteresis and a transcritical bifurcation is present when m = 4.1×10−2. Possible extensions of our
immunology model can include explicit equations for the presence of memory T cells and memory
Tregs. Additionally, we may consider the presence of different lines of T cells responding to different
antigens, at different levels.
We studied prices in a model under the scope of General Equilibrium Theory. We looked at a random
exchange economy with two goods, where the participants’ preferences are characterized by the
Cobb-Douglas utility function. We expanded the results in Pinto et al. [58], allowing trade to deviate
from the bilateral equilibrium. We introduced the concept of p-statistical trading duality, and also
discussed the deviation form the bilateral equilibrium price through the introduction of participants
that may not be fully rational. We proved that under symmetry conditions, the trading price is related
with the Walrasian price of the initial market. As future work, it would be interesting to generalize our
study to other utility functions than the Cobb-Douglas, with the proper generalization of the duality
condition, and to extend such results for the case of financial markets.
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